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Right Problem; Wrong Solution 
Joseph L. Hoffmann† 
Nancy J. King†† 
For the Great Writ of habeas corpus, these are the best of times and the 
worst of times. 
In Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court, in a powerful and eloquent 
majority opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy, vindicated the right of a non-
U.S. citizen, held in custody at a military base outside the United States, to use 
the writ to challenge the legality of his incarceration.1 Boumediene was a 
triumph of both the individual petitioner and the judiciary over the powers of 
the executive, and represents a high-water mark in the long and celebrated 
history of habeas. 
At the same time, in a different context, habeas is under siege. The version 
of the writ that state prisoners use to collaterally attack their criminal 
convictions—long a matter of controversy—is drawing fire once again. A 
recent empirical study, headed by one of the co-authors of this essay, reveals 
how habeas litigation in the criminal context has become almost completely 
futile.2 Excluding the unique category of capital cases, the success rate for 
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1. See generally 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
2. NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. 
DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED BY STATE 
PRISONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996 (2007), 
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf. This study is cited and 
discussed in Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal 
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challenging state criminal judgments in habeas is only one-third of 1 percent.3 
Yet such litigation continues to consume scarce resources and engender 
frustration among federal judges, members of Congress, state government 
officials, crime victims, and academics.4 
The new empirical evidence demonstrating the failure of criminal habeas 
has helped spawn a new wave of scholarly proposals for habeas reform. One 
such proposal is the subject of Professor Eve Brensike Primus’s article, A 
Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus.5 
There is much to like in Professor Primus’s article.  First and foremost, we 
completely agree with her primary premise that habeas litigation in criminal 
cases cannot be justified as a case-by-case remedy for individual violations of 
federal constitutional rights.6 This is the crucial lesson of the recent empirical 
findings, and it is a lesson that Professor Primus takes to heart. Too many 
habeas scholars cling to the romantic vision of habeas as a curative for, or a 
deterrent of, individual case-specific errors in the enforcement of federal rights 
in state criminal cases.7 But the hard data, and the structural explanations that 
lie behind them, obliterate the notion that habeas can possibly serve such a 
romantic role. Professor Primus, to her credit, accepts this reality and moves 
on.8 
We also completely agree with Professor Primus that the solution to the 
myriad problems of criminal habeas lies in the recognition that habeas has 
always been about something else—namely, it has always been about 
addressing structural issues, not individual case-by-case violations.9 Along 
these lines, Professor Primus helpfully traces the particular version of habeas 
used by state convicts today10 to the federalism crisis of Reconstruction.11 
During the Reconstruction, Congress extended the writ to convicted state 
prisoners as a way to ensure the obedience of defeated Confederate officials 
 
Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 791 (2009) [hereinafter Hoffmann & King, Rethinking]. 
3. Hoffmann & King, Rethinking, supra note 2, at 809. 
4. See, e.g., Hearing on Habeas Reform: The Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005: Hearing 
on S. 1088 Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2–3 (2005), available at 
http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/eisenberg_11_16_05_testimony1.pdf (testimony of Ronald 
Eisenberg, Deputy District Att’y, Phila., Pa.) (“In the last decade, the number of [our] lawyers 
employed exclusively on habeas work has increased 400% . . . .The truth is that, whether or not 
they end up reversing a conviction, federal habeas courts drag out litigation for years of utterly 
unjustifiable delay, creating exorbitant costs for the state . . . .”). 
5. 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2010) [hereinafter Primus]. 
6. See id. at 6. 
7. See, e.g., Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness 
to Collateral Review of Criminal Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 360 (2006) (“Repeal or 
suspension of the [habeas restrictions contained in the] AEDPA [statute] is now required to 
improve the quality and reliability of criminal justice in the United States.”).  The “romantic” 
vision of habeas was perhaps best articulated by Justice William J. Brennan in his majority 
opinion in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). 
8. Primus, supra note 5, at 9–12. 
9. Id. at 6–7. 
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006).  
11. Primus, supra note 5, at 13–16. 
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and sympathizers to federal laws that they still viewed as foreign and hostile.12 
As Professor Primus also describes, the Supreme Court, under the 
leadership of Justice William Brennan during the 1960s, came to rely upon 
habeas to deal with a similar crisis of federalism.13 The Warren Court prompted 
that crisis through its so-called criminal procedure revolution, which 
recognized a plethora of new federal criminal procedure rights to coerce the 
states into transforming their criminal justice systems.14 As Justice Brennan 
explained at the time, the Court’s newly minted federal rights could not be 
enforced properly in most states, due to a combination of two factors.15  First, 
some state judges and officials opposed the new rights, viewing their 
imposition by the federal government as illegitimate and insulting.16 Second, 
most states had no post-conviction review process that would allow those new 
federal rights to be asserted in state court.17 
These two examples from habeas history—the expansion of the writ after 
the Civil War and during the Civil Rights Era—reveal that habeas is about 
more than case-by-case litigation over individual rights. We believe, however, 
that a true understanding of habeas and its unique role in our society requires 
pushing beyond the boundaries of criminal habeas altogether. Instead, habeas 
must be examined in all of its varied contexts and applications. 
In a forthcoming book, we have sought to do just that.18 Our analysis 
concludes that habeas has always been about providing the federal judiciary 
with a flexible, but extremely powerful, tool to use whenever a significant 
societal change or crisis places the governmental balance of powers in serious 
jeopardy.19 
Sometimes the balance at stake is the one between the three branches of 
the federal government. In times of crisis, the executive, often aided and 
abetted by the legislature, may seek to imprison those who are perceived to 
 
12. The most important of these new laws consisted of the 13th, 14th, and 15th 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and various federal statutes promulgated to help enforce 
those constitutional provisions.  See generally John E. Nowak, Federalism and the Civil War 
Amendments, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1209 (1997) (describing history and purposes of the 13th, 
14th, and 15th Amendments). 
13. Primus, supra note 5, at 13–14. 
14.  See id. 
15. See William J. Brennan, Jr., Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise 
in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REV. 423 (1961). 
16. See id. at 440 (“[T]he sensitivity of state judges towards federal habeas corpus has been 
heightened as the Supreme Court has dealt increasingly with state administration of justice in 
constitutional terms.”). 
17. See id. at 441 (“I have the personal conviction that if such [state post-conviction] 
procedures were the rule and not the exception, redress by state judiciaries of violations of the 
Federal Constitution would ordinarily result, and intervention by any federal court including the 
United States Supreme Court would become unnecessary.”). 
18. See NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS CORPUS FOR THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY (forthcoming 2010) (expanding in the first chapter upon the argument presented 
here), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1517840. 
19. See id. at 10. 
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pose a threat. 
Sometimes, as occurred after the Civil War and during the civil rights era, 
the balance at stake is the one between the federal and state governments.20  
During such a crisis of federalism, the hostile states may disregard federally 
guaranteed rights or even seek to imprison those who represent federal 
interests. 
In both kinds of national crises, the federal judiciary—and especially the 
Supreme Court—must possess the ability to respond flexibly to the particular 
crisis at hand. Habeas is an inherently flexible remedy. It allows the courts to 
deal with any kind of governmental overreaching that seriously threatens 
individual liberty, even when the particular form of overreaching could not 
have been anticipated. The judiciary can readily adapt the writ to address any 
kind of new situation involving fundamentally unjust incarceration.  This is the 
great power that led the Framers to view habeas with such respect, even 
reverence.21 
But with great power comes great responsibility. Habeas is a potent 
remedy that the judiciary must use prudently, lest the courts inadvertently drain 
the deep reservoir of respect that has sustained it for centuries. Sweeping 
habeas decisions, like Boumediene22 and Gideon v. Wainwright,23 that assert 
the power of the federal judiciary to block other institutions of government 
from imprisoning persons in defiance or disregard of the Constitution, are built 
on that foundation of respect. 
The twin attributes of flexibility and prudence have long shaped the story 
of habeas. Viewed across the entire sweep of American history, and in varied 
contexts including but not limited to the review of criminal cases, habeas 
repeatedly has been pressed into service as an emergency stop-gap measure, 
allowing the courts to intervene and order the release of prisoners who would 
otherwise be left without an adequate remedy.24 However, as the issuance of 
the writ becomes common, lawmakers’ attention turns to tailoring a remedy for 
the specific threat to liberty at hand, developing alternative avenues for judicial 
review. Eventually, these alternative procedures supplant habeas litigation.  
When habeas works well, in other words, it gradually brings about its own 
obsolescence. This story has been repeated time and time again, in 
controversies involving immigration, terrorism, war, and federal crimes.25 
The problem with habeas review of state criminal cases is that, even 
though the particular crisis of federalism that gave rise to its twentieth-century 
expansion has long since passed, the federal courts continue to entertain, on a 
routine basis, vast numbers of habeas petitions filed by convicted state 
 
20. See id. 
21. See id. at 11. 
22 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
23. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
24. See KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 18, at 12–13. 
25. All of these examples, and more, are discussed in our new book.  See id.  
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prisoners.26 This remains true even though such prisoners today generally enjoy 
the full opportunity to seek judicial review in state court for asserted violations 
of their federal constitutional rights.27 
Professor Primus points out that these state courts do not always side with 
the prisoner, and she clearly sees the glass of state judicial review as half 
empty.28 We beg to differ. Compared with the structural barriers to state 
judicial review that state prisoners faced in the 1960s, which Justice Brennan 
described, the glass today is much more than half full.  All states now provide 
convicted prisoners with not only an opportunity for direct appeal of their 
federal claims, but also some form of modern post-conviction review to deal 
with non-record federal claims, such as ineffective assistance of counsel or 
prosecutorial withholding of exculpatory evidence.29 And today, state judges as 
a rule no longer resist federal law simply because it is federal.  Disagreements 
over the scope and content of federal constitutional rights persist in state courts 
as well as lower federal courts, but state judges are no longer fighting the 
enforcement of criminal procedure rules simply because they arise from the 
federal constitution rather than from state law.30 
This wholesale acceptance of the supremacy of federal criminal procedure 
law makes all the difference, once habeas is properly viewed as a flexible 
remedy for serious disruptions in the balance of government powers.  Professor 
Primus argues forcefully that we “underestimate[] the degree to which state 
courts still routinely violate defendants’ constitutional rights,”31 and she 
provides many examples.  But even if her argument holds water, she does not 
claim that the state courts are failing to vindicate those federal rights because 
they are federal.  If this were still true, then we might still be facing the kind of 
structural crisis involving government powers that habeas is designed to 
address.  We are convinced, however, that this is no longer true. 
We acknowledge that reasonable persons might disagree over the “half-
full, half-empty” characterization of state judicial review of federal 
constitutional claims in criminal cases.  But the Supreme Court and Congress 
clearly no longer perceive the need for more aggressive federal habeas 
oversight of the state courts in non-capital cases.32 Yet the habeas dance goes 
 
26. In 2006, habeas corpus petitions filed by non-capital state prisoners made up one of 
every fourteen civil cases filed in the United States district courts. JAMES C. DUFF, 2006 JUDICIAL 
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 162 (2007) 
(Table C-2), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2006/front/ 
completejudicialbusiness.pdf.  
27. Hoffmann & King, Rethinking, supra note 2, at 795, 835–36. 
28. See Primus, supra note 5, at 16–23 (explaining the reasons behind her view that a 
“coercive” model of federal judicial review is still necessary). 
29. Hoffmann & King, Rethinking, supra note 2, at 841–42 nn. 187–188. 
30. Joseph L. Hoffmann & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the Revolution, 1993 SUP. CT. 
REV. 65, 77–80 (1994). 
31. See Primus, supra note 5, at 17. 
32. See Hoffmann & King, Rethinking, supra note 2, at 805–06  (noting congressional 
restrictions on habeas review under the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act); id. 
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on, with convicted state prisoners filing tens of thousands of habeas petitions 
each year that must be defended by states’ attorneys and reviewed by federal 
courts.33 
In the end, we think Professor Primus does not go far enough with her 
structural analysis. When Professor Primus refers to the “structural vision” of 
habeas,34 she is talking about using habeas to try to force a change in the 
structure of state criminal justice. When we talk about a “structural approach” 
to habeas, by contrast, we are talking about using habeas to force a change in 
the relationship between institutions of government—either a change in the 
federal balance of powers, or a change in the balance of federalism.  During the 
1960s, habeas did help to bring about such a change in the balance of 
federalism, by forcing reluctant states to accept the supremacy of federal 
criminal procedure law and to provide a state judicial review process 
appropriately designed to vindicate that law.35 Problems in state criminal 
justice may persist, but they are no longer caused by state resistance to federal 
authority. The problems of today—whether they involve the failings of police, 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, jurors, judges, or legislators—are not the kinds 
of problems that habeas is designed to, or can, solve. 
This leads to our final observation about Professor Primus’s article.  After 
providing a comprehensive review and critique of habeas reform proposals 
advanced over the past several decades, Professor Primus proposes a truly 
novel approach. Her approach would convert habeas from a case-by-case 
remedy into a remedy for constitutional violations that occur in many different 
cases—to address what she defines as a “systemic” problem.36 In other words, 
she proposes to turn habeas into something that would resemble the 
substance—although certainly not the form—of class-action litigation. She 
would provide federal attorneys to help individual habeas petitioners develop 
the facts in support of their claims of “systemic” violations.37 And she would 
authorize the federal courts to order the release of individual petitioners, and—
via separate habeas petitions handled on a “fast-track” basis—all other 
petitioners similarly situated.38 This release authority would be available unless 
and until the particular state fixed the particular “systemic” problem identified 
by the federal courts.39 
We have already explained why we think the problems of state criminal 
justice today are not the kinds of problems that post-conviction litigation in 
 
at 812 n.74 (listing limitations on habeas review imposed by the Court since 1973).  
33. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 
43 (2004) (Table C-2), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2004/tables/C02Mar04.pdf 
(reporting that 18,552 petitions were filed in federal district courts in 2004).  
34. See Primus, supra note 5, at 1 (article title). 
35. See Hoffmann & King, Rethinking, supra note 2, at 835. 
36. See Primus, supra note 5, at 5 (defining “systemic” violation). 
37. See id. at 35–39. 
38. See id. at 31–33. 
39. See id. at 32–33. 
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habeas can solve. Professor Primus’s proposal purports to overcome these 
shortcomings by (1) requiring Congress to pay lawyers to represent (all?) 
indigent prisoners who allege violations that they claim are “systemic”; (2) 
eliminating the exhaustion requirement (even for appeals?) so that thousands of 
additional prisoners would be able to file their claims directly in federal court; 
and (3) adding a new prerequisite for relief requiring that a petitioner not only 
clear existing procedural hurdles, but also establish that some unspecified 
proportion of other prisoners (should have?) succeeded based on the “same” 
claim.40 Implementing this complicated new scheme and resolving the many 
questions left unanswered in the proposal would increase, rather than decrease, 
the volume, complexity, and cost of habeas litigation in the federal courts.  At 
root, the proposal is yet another version of the same strategy we argue is both 
obsolete and unwise.41 The proposal would continue to sink even more tax 
dollars into post-conviction litigation of claims of error that competent defense 
counsel likely could have prevented or cured earlier at much lower cost.  
Moreover, under Professor Primus’s proposal, many of these claims, even if 
valid, will continue to be waived in pleas, forfeited by mistakes, and ignored 
after conviction as harmless. 
Professor Primus’s particular version of post-conviction litigation, we 
fear, would prove especially unworkable.  The proposal would effectively place 
the federal courts in the position of not only catalyzing, but also supervising on 
an ongoing basis, the reform of innumerable aspects of state criminal justice.  
We are deeply skeptical that federal courts are appropriate for this supervisory 
role, since they lack the ability to conduct studies, hold legislative-type 
hearings, balance competing governmental needs and interests, or deal with 
complex political pressures. 
More importantly, the proposal stands little chance of adoption. Professor 
Primus acknowledges the need for a quid pro quo kind of trade-off that would 
provide Congress and the states an incentive to buy into any new idea that 
could lead to serious state criminal justice reform.42 But her proposal offers 
precious little “quid” in exchange for a very large “quo.” Habeas litigation 
would become more costly and complicated under her proposal, for both the 
federal government and the states. And the states will understandably resist any 
proposal that may force them to relinquish control over their criminal justice 
systems to the ongoing close supervision of the federal judiciary. The lack of a 
more balanced quid pro quo dooms Professor Primus’s proposal to the 
netherworld of academic commentary. 
 
40. See id. at 26–40. 
41. This is the strategy of post hoc litigation in the federal courts, as opposed to our 
suggested strategy that focuses on a comprehensive federal approach to stimulating and 
supporting reforms at the state level.  See generally Hoffmann & King, Rethinking, supra note 2 
(presenting and explaining our suggested strategy). 
42. See Primus, supra note 6, at 41 (stressing need for “compromise between rival political 
camps”). 
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We have previously proposed what we think is a more plausible quid pro 
quo. Our proposal, outlined in an article we published in the New York 
University Law Review, is less ambitious, focusing on the reform of just one 
key aspect of state criminal justice: the adequacy of defense representation.43  
We consider this to be the most important aspect because competent defense 
attorneys can help to protect all other rights, for innocent as well as guilty 
defendants. Our proposal relies on state-driven best practices, contemplates 
voluntary, not forced, reforms, and includes the “carrot” of federal grant 
funding for states, to whatever extent Congress might be persuaded to authorize 
such funding.44 Perhaps this is also politically unlikely, especially in the current 
economy. But without such a supply of additional resources for the states, no 
proposal to reform state criminal justice is likely to make much of a difference.  
We believe our reform proposal, limited as it is, has a much better chance of 
being adopted and eventually achieving some kind of success than Professor 
Primus’s proposal, which would exacerbate even further the cost of post-
conviction litigation and put the federal courts in charge of a potentially 
unlimited reform agenda. 
 
43. Hoffmann & King, Rethinking, supra note 2, at 823–25. 
44. Id. at 823–33. 
